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PRE-TWOMBLY PRECEDENT:
HAVE LEATHERMAN AND SWIERKIEWICZ
EARNED RETIREMENT TOO?
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ABSTRACT
In theory, a complaint is a relatively minor part of a lawsuit,
intended to initiate the litigation process. In practice, federal courts are
struggling to implement the Supreme Court’s opinions in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. This struggle is
due, in part, to the fact that neither Twombly nor Iqbal expressly
overruled the Court’s pre-Twombly pleading jurisprudence. This
Note focuses on how lower courts are assessing the continued vitality
of two major pre-Twombly cases: Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit and Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A. It finds that lower courts are taking conflicting views on
the status of pre-Twombly precedent and concludes that this discord
has serious consequences for litigation costs, respect for stare decisis,
and litigants’ access to justice.
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I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot
be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active
litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper
pleadings . . . .
1

– Judge Charles Clark

INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
2
3
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, lower federal courts have struggled
to figure out exactly what these decisions mean for civil pleading
standards. Only one thing is clear from Twombly regarding the
treatment of past precedent: the familiar standard laid out in Conley
4
v. Gibson, that a motion to dismiss should only be granted if there is
“no set of facts” to support the plaintiff’s claim, is no longer to be
5
employed. As the Court noted, this standard “has earned its
6
retirement.” What remains an important and open question,
however, is how lower courts should treat the Court’s pre-Twombly
pleading jurisprudence that has neither been explicitly retired nor
explicitly overruled.
The Fourth Circuit recently examined this question in McCleary7
Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation. The case
illustrates lower courts’ eight-year struggle to reconcile Twombly and
Iqbal with pre-Twombly authority that remains good law. In
McCleary-Evans, a divided panel dismissed an employment8
discrimination complaint that relied on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
9
to state the applicable pleading standard. The court found that, in
1. Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”, 21 F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957).
2. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding, in relevant part, that a
complaint must allege facts with enough specificity to state a claim for relief that is plausible,
not merely conceivable).
3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (clarifying that the plausibility-pleading
standard announced in Twombly applies to all federal court cases).
4. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63.
6. Id. at 563.
7. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2015), petition for cert.
filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-573). For an in-depth description of this
case, see infra Part IV.
8. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (holding that under Rule 8(a)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need allege only a short and plain
statement of the claims showing entitlement to relief, rather than establish a prima facie case).
9. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 583–84, 588.
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light of Twombly and Iqbal, Swierkiewicz had “applied a more lenient
10
pleading standard” than required. The dissent noted that lower
courts are devoid of the power to overrule Supreme Court precedent,
no matter how out-of-vogue these past precedents may seem when
11
compared to the Court’s more recent case law.
Twombly and Iqbal generated vast amounts of scholarship
12
debating the impact these decisions would have on lower courts.
These pieces either expressed concern that plaintiffs would be unable
to survive the pleading stage without access to discovery in cases
13
where the defendant has critical information or argued that such
14
concerns were overblown. This debate gave rise to a body of
literature that assessed Twombly and Iqbal’s (“Twiqbal”) impact
15
through empirical data. This empirical work has “overwhelmingly
focused on the question of whether judges have indeed applied a

10. Id. at 587.
11. See id. at 590 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have no authority to overrule a Supreme
Court decision no matter . . . how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the
decision seems.” (quoting Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002))).
12. See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (examining what Iqbal
adds to Twombly’s plausibility pleading and court access); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135 (2007) (analyzing how the
Twombly ruling required lower courts to change their pleading jurisprudence); Adam N.
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (addressing the new paradigm
of pleading following Iqbal).
13. Dodson, supra note 12, at 138–39.
14. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621,
1637–43 (2012).
15. See generally, e.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 6 (2011) (comparing the filing and resolution of motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) in twenty-three federal district courts in
2006 and 2010); Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96
JUDICATURE 127 (2012) (assessing the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissals at the
pleading stage); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L.
REV. 2117 (2015) (analyzing whether Iqbal and Twombly’s new standards have significantly
changed how motions to dismiss in general are resolved); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121
YALE L.J. 2270 (2012) (showing how party selection undermined the empirical usefulness of
simple grant-rate comparisons and provided an alternative analysis by modeling party
behavior); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008)
(attempting to answer empirically whether federal district courts applying Twombly required
more from pleadings than they did prior to the decision).
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16

higher standard.” To answer this question, empirical studies have
focused on grant rates of 12(b)(6) motions. In other words, they have
focused on results only. Interestingly, after reviewing these studies,
Professor Jonah Gelbach claims that “data are unlikely to settle the
debate over the case-quality effects of the new pleading regime
17
ushered in by Twombly and Iqbal.”
Rather than focus on outcomes alone, this Note measures
Twombly and Iqbal’s impact on civil litigation by taking a substantive
look at lower-court reasoning when testing a claim’s sufficiency.
Specifically, how do courts treat the conflicting notice-pleading
standard reaffirmed in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
18
Intelligence and Coordination Unit and Swierkiewicz in light of
Twombly and Iqbal? Analyzing how seventy-four district court cases
apply these pre-Twombly precedents begins to reveal the impact
Twombly and Iqbal are having on civil litigation. By looking at these
opinions’ reasoning, this Note shows that lower courts are taking
discordant approaches to the status of pre-Twombly precedent. This
discord has serious consequences for litigation costs, respect for stare
decisis, and litigant access to the judicial system.
This Note consists of six parts. Part I provides the context for this
study by briefly summarizing the history of pleading standards at the
federal level and tracing the development of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s pleading
jurisprudence and highlights the tension in the case law created by
both Twombly and Iqbal. Part III describes how the circuit courts
have treated pre-Twombly precedent and what guidance, if any, this
treatment provides to district courts. Part IV describes the
methodology this study employed. Part V shows how district courts
have treated pre-Twombly case law after Iqbal. Finally, Part VI
analyzes lower courts’ behavior and calls on the Supreme Court to
clarify civil pleading standards.

16. Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate Over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).
17. Id. (manuscript at 4).
18. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163
(1993). In Leatherman, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal court could apply a
“‘heightened pleading standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)” in civil-rights cases. Id. at 164. The Court held that such heightened pleading standards
were “impossible to square” with the system of “notice pleading” codified by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 168. Leatherman is discussed further infra Part II.A.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
19

A very brief review of the historical functions of pleading
provides the context for this study. It illustrates that remnants of
these systems, especially in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, influence
modern pleading practice. In their simplest form, complaints are the
documents that state a plaintiff’s claim, put a defendant on notice,
20
and prompt the defendant to answer and raise defenses. For the first
century after the American Revolution, pleadings’ key function was
21
issue-formulating. By the mid-nineteenth century, complaints
22
focused on parties stating “material” and “ultimate” facts. And in
the twentieth century, the system emphasized pleading’s “notice”
23
function.
24
Common-law pleading was highly technical. Under the issueforming process, it was the parties’ obligation to narrow their dispute
25
down to a “single material point.” This process consisted of the
parties pleading back and forth. The parties would make factual
allegations and respond by either (1) demurring, challenging the legal
sufficiency of the claim; (2) accepting the facts alleged, but adding a
new matter; or finally (3) denying a single material point, forming the
26
“single issue” to be resolved at trial. The trial would then focus on
this issue alone.

19. An in-depth analysis of the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
beyond the scope of this Note. For a complete historical study, see generally Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
20. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROCEDURE 20 (2013).
21. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 916 (discussing the common-law pleading procedures
adopted by the United States after the American Revolution).
22. See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13–14 (2013)
(describing the confusion caused by the Field Code’s attempt to distinguish between ultimate
facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law). For further discussion of the Field Code, see
infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
23. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 946–47 (quoting Roscoe Pound—one of the architects of
the modern pleading system—regarding the purpose of notice pleading).
24. See id. at 916 (explaining how the early pleading system was designed to resolve a
single issue).
25. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 4, at 11 (1st ed.
1928).
26. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 916 (detailing the basic procedures of common-law
pleading); see also DODSON, supra note 22, at 7–8 (discussing the “back-and-forth colloquy” of
common-law pleadings).
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Common-law pleading also required plaintiffs to obtain a writ
that related to the subject matter of the dispute. Writs were “royal
order[s] which authorised a court to hear a case and instructed a
27
sheriff to secure the attendance of the defendant.” But because writs
were “limited to cases where precedents existed,” the types of suits
28
that could be brought were highly restricted. The requirement of a
writ, coupled with the fact that a trial on the merits could resolve only
one issue, created a system fraught with technical difficulties that
severely limited relief. These issues led to common-law pleading
being replaced by code pleading.
29
The Field Code abolished the writ system and combined all
30
causes of action into the civil action. Under code pleading, a
complaint was to allege “material” facts and avoid stating “evidential
31
facts” and “conclusions of law.” Although the code reduced the
technicalities of pleadings, in practice it proved difficult to distinguish
32
between facts, evidence, and conclusions. The code thus created a
33
“whole new corpus of legal technicality at the pleading stage,”
leading to another push for reform that resulted in the creation of the
34
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) in 1938.
The goal in drafting the Federal Rules was to identify procedures
35
that would “most efficiently foster decisions on the merits.” The
Federal Rules ushered in an era of liberalized pleading as they
36
“replaced fact pleading with notice pleading.” Rule 8(a)(2), which
sets out what a plaintiff is required to state in the complaint, requires

27. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 22 (1969).
28. CLARK, supra note 25, § 4, at 11–12.
29. The code was named after its principal draftsman David Dudley Field. Id. § 8, at 18.
30. Id. at 18–19. This language would later be incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
31. CLARK, supra note 25, § 38, at 150.
32. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574 (2007) (describing the struggle of
distinguishing evidence, facts, and conclusions); CLARK, supra note 25, § 38, at 155 (describing
“attempted distinction between facts, law and evidence” as a “convenient distinction of
degree”).
33. DODSON, supra note 22, at 14.
34. See id. at 15–16 (tracing the movement from the Field Code to the Federal Rules).
35. Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179 (1989).
36. Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004). Notice pleading refers to a
system of pleading created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where all that is required is
“‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
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that a plaintiff provide the court with “a short and plain statement of
37
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” For over
fifty years, lower courts based their understanding of Rule 8(a)’s
requirements and the demands of “notice pleading” upon the
38
Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson.
II. FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS FROM CONLEY TO IQBAL
This Part summarizes the Court’s pre-Twombly precedents,
briefly describes the changes wrought by Twombly and Iqbal, and
shows that the Court continues to send lower courts mixed messages
by citing affirmatively to pre-Twombly precedent.
A. Pre-Twombly Precedent
In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court articulated Rule 8(a)’s
requirements. Conley made clear that “the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
39
which he bases his claim.” The Court stated that, to satisfy Rule
8(a), a complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what
40
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Under
this notice-pleading approach, a court would not dismiss a complaint
“unless it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
41
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
For nearly fifty years after Conley, notice pleading was the
dominant standard employed by lower courts when assessing a
42
complaint’s sufficiency. Although some lower courts pushed back by
43
imposing judicially created heightened pleading standards, the
Supreme Court struck down such standards in 1993 in Leatherman

37. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
38. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52
HOW. L.J. 99, 102 (2008) (explaining that for several decades after Conley was decided, courts
followed the decision’s notice-pleading standards).
39. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 45–46.
42. See Spencer, supra note 38, at 102–05 (noting that, in “the decade or so after Conley,”
district courts applied notice pleading when testing the sufficiency of complaints).
43. Christopher Fairman and Richard Marcus have argued that lower courts have had a
longstanding tendency to impose heightened pleading even after the Supreme Court insisted
upon a notice-pleading standard in Conley. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice
Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1998).
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and again in 2002 in Swierkiewicz. On both occasions, the Court
reaffirmed its commitment to Conley and Rule 8(a)’s notice-pleading
standard.
In Leatherman, a police officer detected a chemical odor
associated with methamphetamines outside of the Leatherman
44
home. The police obtained a search warrant for the home based
upon the officer’s observation and executed the warrant while the
45
Leathermans were away. While searching for the narcotics, the
46
officers shot and killed the two Leatherman family dogs. No drugs
47
were recovered. The Leathermans filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the officers’ conduct violated their Fourth Amendment
48
rights. The federal district court dismissed the Leathermans’
complaint, finding that they failed to meet the Fifth Circuit’s
49
“heightened pleading standard.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding
that complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983 must plead
50
facts with particularity.
The Supreme Court reversed and unanimously held that a
federal court may not apply a “heightened pleading standard” in civil51
rights cases alleging municipal liability. The Court reasoned that
Rule 9(b) imposes a particularity requirement on pleadings alleging
52
fraud or mistake, but does not make “any reference to complaints
53
alleging municipal liability.” Therefore, lower courts cannot apply a
heightened pleading requirement to complaints alleging municipal
54
liability.

44. Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
BZjlnyWGwh4&feature=youtu.be
[http://perma.cc/WJH2-D83R]
(documenting
the
circumstances surrounding the Leatherman case).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
164–65 (1993).
49. Id. at 165.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 164.
52. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s
mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
53. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
54. Id.
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More importantly, the Court found that a heightened pleading
standard was “impossible to square” with the fact that Rule 8(a)(2)
requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
55
the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Court emphatically endorsed
notice pleading by saying “[i]n Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect that
56
the Rule meant what it said.”
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Court again rejected a
heightened pleading standard, this time in the employmentdiscrimination context. Akos Swierkiewicz was a fifty-three-year-old
Hungarian native employed by Sorema N.A. as a senior vice
57
president and chief underwriting officer (CUO). Sorema N.A. was
58
owned and controlled by a French parent corporation. Almost six
59
years after being hired, the CEO demoted Mr. Swierkiewicz and
gave many of his responsibilities to a thirty-two-year-old French
60
national. A year later, the CEO said that “he wanted to ‘energize’
the underwriting department” and he appointed the young
61
Frenchman as CUO. Mr. Swierkiewicz brought suit alleging
discrimination based on his age and national origin in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Title VII of the
62
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that Swierkiewicz “ha[d] not adequately
63
alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.”
64
The Second Circuit affirmed.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas distinguished
65
evidentiary standards from pleading standards. The Court held that
an employment-discrimination complaint need not state specific facts
66
making out a prima facie case. In doing so, the Court again endorsed
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard and stated that “[g]iven the
55. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
56. Id.
57. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 509.
63. Id. (alteration in original).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 511–12.
66. See id. at 515 (“[T]he Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for
employment discrimination suits.”). The prima facie case for employment discrimination was
laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading ‘[a] court may dismiss
a complaint only if it is clear no relief could be granted under any set
67
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’” The
Court emphasized that its holding was not limited to employmentdiscrimination cases. Rather, the Court said that “Rule 8(a)’s
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
68
exceptions.”
With these two cases, the Supreme Court sent a clear message to
lower courts: the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8(a) applied to all
civil actions unless the Federal Rules or a federal statute specified
otherwise. The Supreme Court left the notice-pleading framework
untouched for five years, until it revisited civil pleading standards in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
B. Twombly, Iqbal, and Thereafter
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
69
Twombly marked a significant departure from the Court’s earlier
70
pleading jurisprudence. Although Twombly and its potential impact
71
have been the subject of an incredible amount of scholarly debate,
two points can be clearly distilled from the case. First, Justice Souter
and the Twombly majority decided that Conley’s “no set of facts”
72
language had “earned its retirement.” Second, the Court replaced
73
the liberal Conley standard with a new “plausibility” standard.
Under this plausibility standard, a plaintiff must plead enough facts
74
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” To be more
than mere speculation, a complaint must state facts that move the

67. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (alteration in original) (quoting Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
68. Id. at 513. The limited exceptions mentioned by the Court are Rule 9(b), see supra note
52, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which imposes a heightened
pleading standard for claims involving securities fraud. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 747.
69. For a complete analysis of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, see generally Allan Ides,
Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2007).
70. Although Twombly introduced a new pleading paradigm, it did not overrule (or retire)
any of the Court’s prior Rule 8 decisions other than Conley. In fact, Twombly reaffirms
Swierkiewicz as good law. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007).
71. For examples of this debate, see supra note 12.
72. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
73. Id. at 556–57.
74. Id. at 555.
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claim across “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Despite
introducing a new standard, the Court maintained that they were not
76
requiring “heightened fact pleading of specifics.” The Court clearly
moved away from a notice-pleading interpretation of Rule 8(a) yet
insisted that it was not raising pleading standards; this move created
tension within the opinion.
After Twombly, it was unclear whether or not Twombly’s new
plausibility standard applied to all civil actions. Some thought that
77
Twombly applied only in the antitrust context, while others
contended that Twombly applied to all civil actions and that the days
78
of notice pleading were over. The confusion and debate were fueled
two years later when the Court attempted to clarify Twombly and
plausibility pleading in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
Iqbal confirmed that the Twombly Court’s plausibility
interpretation of Rule 8(a) was trans-substantive. Thus, the
plausibility-pleading standard applies “in all civil actions and
79
proceedings in the United States district courts.” Iqbal also outlined
a “two-pronged approach” for courts to use when assessing a
80
complaint’s sufficiency. First, courts must identify and disregard all
81
legal allegations in the complaint that are conclusory in nature.
Second, courts must test whether the remaining nonconclusory
82
allegations plausibly entitle the plaintiff to relief. The Court
observed that determining plausibility is “a context-specific task that

75. Id. at 557.
76. Id. at 570.
77. See Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., No. 07-1044-MLB, 2007 WL 2219288, at *2
n.2 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007) (“Bell Atlantic deals only with pleading requirements in the highly
complex context of an antitrust conspiracy case.”); see also Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA,
LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that Twombly’s plausibilitypleading standard was confined to cases involving “expensive, complicated litigation” (quoting
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009))).
78. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We
have declined to read Twombly’s flexible ‘plausibility standard’ as relating only to antitrust
cases.” (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice pleading is dead.”); Dodson, supra note 12, at 138 (“Clearly,
Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is dead . . . .”).
79. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
80. Id. at 679.
81. See id. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
82. Id. at 679 (“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion
to dismiss.”).
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requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
83
common sense.”
The tension lower courts must reconcile can be summed up as
84
follows: Iqbal makes it clear that Twombly applies to all civil actions,
85
yet Swierkiewicz, which was reaffirmed by Twombly, and
Leatherman stand for the proposition that Rule 8(a)’s notice-pleading
standard also applies to all civil actions. Moreover, Twiqbal never
explicitly overruled either Leatherman or Swierkiewicz. Only the
Supreme Court can overrule its own decisions; thus these preTwombly precedents should not be disregarded by lower courts as no
86
longer being in line with the Court’s current thinking.
In fact, given the Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. City of
87
Shelby, it appears that both Leatherman and Swierkiewicz remain
viable. In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
rejection of a plaintiff’s due-process claim because the plaintiff did
88
not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her complaint. The Supreme Court
summarily reversed and held that “no heightened pleading rule
requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional
89
rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim.” In
support of its holding, the Court cited positively to both Leatherman
90
and Swierkiewicz, suggesting that both cases remain at the forefront
of the Court’s Rule 8(a) jurisprudence.
When the Supreme Court held that Twombly’s plausibility
pleading standard applied to all civil actions, it created tension with
its prior Rule 8(a) precedents that relied on the more lenient noticepleading standard. The discord is due, in part, to the fact that the
Court did not overrule its pre-Twombly precedents. Indeed, the
Court saw no reason to overrule its prior case law as it maintained
91
that Twombly did not create a more stringent pleading standard.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 684.
85. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
86. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (noting that only the Court has “the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))). Professor Adam Steinman has made this point in the
same context. See Steinman, supra note 12, at 1320–23 (arguing that pre-Twombly case law
remains good law).
87. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014) (per curiam).
88. Id. at 346.
89. Id. at 347.
90. Id.
91. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
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Lower courts and commentators have had a difficult time accepting
this claim. The next Part focuses on how the federal courts of appeals
have treated Leatherman and Swierkiewicz after Iqbal.
III. CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF LEATHERMAN AND
SWIERKIEWICZ
The federal circuit courts of appeals that have confronted the
92
issue have taken discordant views on the vitality of pre-Twombly
precedents. The cases reveal three approaches. Two circuits have
noted the tension between pre-Twombly case law and Twiqbal but
have declined to resolve the issue. Another five circuits have held that
pre-Twombly case law remains good law, with one of these courts
going so far as to still apply the notice-pleading standard. Finally,
three circuits have radically reinterpreted pre-Twombly authority.
A. Courts Declining to Resolve the Issue
Decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuits illustrate the
difficulty of defining a uniform pleading standard. Neither case
definitively resolves the tension between pre-Twombly authority and
Twiqbal, which leaves the status of pre-Twombly precedent an open
question in these circuits.
93
In Hedges v. Town of Madison, a plaintiff brought an
employment-discrimination suit against his former employer, the
94
Town of Madison, and various town officials. The plaintiff’s
complaint stated that he was fired because he was nearing retirement
age, but the only fact alleged in support of this claim was the
95
plaintiff’s age. The Second Circuit opened by observing that “[t]he
pleading standard for employment-discrimination complaints is
96
somewhat of an open question in our circuit.” The court laid out the
competing standards of Swierkiewicz and Twombly, and mused that
“Swierkiewicz[’s] reliance on Conley suggests that, at a minimum,

92. As of February 2016, the Fifth Circuit has published no opinions discussing the
applicability of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz in a post-Iqbal world.
93. Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2012).
94. Id. at 22–23.
95. Id. at 23. Plaintiff also alleged that his firing violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Rehabilitation Act. Id. However, his complaint did not allege that he qualified as
disabled under these acts. Id. at 24. Rather, he argued that the “district court should have
inferred he was disabled” given a litany of health issues he suffered from. Id.
96. Id. at 23.
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employment-discrimination claims must meet the standard of
97
pleading set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.” The court nonetheless
opined that it “need not resolve these conflicts here,” as the plaintiff
98
had failed to meet “any conceivable standard of pleading.” The
court thus avoided making any decisions about Swierkiewicz’s
continued vitality.
99
Starr v. Baca, out of the Ninth Circuit, is another example of a
court expressing confusion over what pleading standard to apply. In
Starr, the plaintiff brought a damages action under § 1983, alleging
that police officers endorsed other inmates’ violent attack on the
100
plaintiff while he was an inmate in a Los Angeles County jail. The
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s supervisory-liability claim,
which was based upon the sheriff’s alleged deliberate indifference to
101
the plaintiff’s injury. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that the
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a), but the court
struggled to identify the appropriate pleading standard:
The juxtaposition of Swierkiewicz . . . on the one hand, . . . and . . .
Twombly[] and Iqbal, on the other, is perplexing. Even though the
Court stated . . . that it was applying Rule 8(a), it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading standard
102
in . . . Twombly and Iqbal.

The court did not make a definitive statement about the status of
pre-Twombly precedent within the circuit. Instead, the court
extracted principles common to both standards and created a hybrid
standard that would permit more claims to survive a motion to
dismiss than would otherwise under the plausibility-pleading
103
regime. The court framed this two-part rule as follows:
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a
complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of
action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to
give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011).
100. Id. at 1204.
101. Id. at 1205.
102. Id. at 1215.
103. Id. at 1216 (“To the extent that we perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a)
in the two groups of cases, it is difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should
apply the more lenient or the more demanding standard.”).
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effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true
must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense
104
of discovery and continued litigation.

Using this rule, the court reversed the district court and
105
remanded the case. This standard still governs cases in the Ninth
Circuit. But, as the district court cases in Part V suggest, it is unclear
that this rule provides any more certainty than the competing
standards created by the Supreme Court.
B. Circuits Holding that Pre-Twombly Precedent Remains Good
Law
Other circuits have been willing to go beyond simply
acknowledging the tension in the Supreme Court’s pleading
jurisprudence and have concluded that pre-Twombly precedent is still
good law. The common thread among these cases is a reliance on
Swierkiewicz and/or an affirmative statement that it remains good law
106
after Twiqbal.
107
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Keys v. Humana illustrates the
reasoning these circuits apply. In Keys, an African American
employee brought racial-discrimination claims under Title VII of the
108
109
Civil Rights Act of 1964
and § 1981
against her former
110
employer. The district court granted Humana’s motion to dismiss,
but the Sixth Circuit reversed, relying on Swierkiewicz to hold that
111
the complaint sufficiently stated a claim. The court noted that “[t]he
104. Id. at 1216.
105. Id. at 1217.
106. This Section does not fully review each of these cases. Those not specifically addressed
are Horras v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2013), Khalik v. United Air
Lines, 671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012), and Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir.
2010).
107. Keys v. Humana, 684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). This Section provides that
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Id. § 1981(a).
110. Keys, 684 F.3d at 606.
111. Id. at 609–10.
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Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not
112
alter its holding in Swierkiewicz.” The court went on to reiterate
that the Sixth Circuit has “recognized the continuing viability of
Swierkiewicz’s holding” and that “it would be ‘inaccurate to read
[Twombly and Iqbal] so narrowly as to be the death of notice
113
pleading.’” The court thus “recognize[d] the continuing viability of
the ‘short and plain’ language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
114
8.”
Although this Sixth Circuit case is notable for its endorsement of
Swierkiewicz, the Eleventh Circuit went even further in its
affirmation of the vitality of pre-Twombly precedent in Palm Beach
115
Golf Center–Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A. The case is
116
factually distinct from the others addressed in this Note, but is
notable for its reading of Twombly and Iqbal. In holding that the
plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently stated a claim, the court stated that
“under the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading [a] court
may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with
117
the allegations.” This is a direct application of Swierkiewicz’s
notice-pleading standard, which was based on Conley’s “no set of
facts” language. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit apparently does not view
Twombly and Iqbal as having displaced notice pleading or any
important pre-Twombly precedents, like Swierkiewicz.
C. Circuit Courts that Radically Reinterpreted Pre-Twombly
Precedent
Three circuits have followed the logic that, because Twombly
retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language, the Supreme Court’s preTwombly authorities that relied on Conley are no longer viable.
112. Id. at 609.
113. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 614
(6th Cir. 2012)).
114. Id.
115. Palm Beach Golf Center–Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245 (11th
Cir. 2015).
116. “Palm Beach Golf Center–Boca, Inc. received an unsolicited one-page fax
advertisement, promoting dental services provided by” dentist John G. Sarris, the owner of a
Florida dental practice. Id. at 1248. Thereafter, Palm Beach Golf brought a class-action suit
against Sarris, D.D.S., claiming that the fax advertisement violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991. Id. at 1248–49.
117. Id. at 1260 (alteration in original) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
514 (2002)).
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Although this reasoning has been disavowed by the Supreme Court,
it highlights the conflict and confusion lower courts encounter when
deciding the proper pleading standard for civil cases.
119
In Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, several plaintiffs
sued their former employer under § 1983, alleging discrimination
120
based on their political affiliation. Reversing the district court, the
121
First Circuit held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim. In
doing so, the court stated that “the Swierkiewicz holding remains
122
good law” after Iqbal. But the court relied on Swierkiewicz’s
applicability regarding the “disconnect between the prima facie case
and the rules of pleading” and not Swierkiewicz’s interpretation of
123
Rule 8(a)’s requirements. The court clarified that “[t]o the extent
that the Swierkiewicz Court relied on Conley v. Gibson to describe
124
the pleading standard, that description is no longer viable.”
125
The Third Circuit too has noted the “demise of Swierkiewicz.”
126
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, the plaintiff filed a disability127
discrimination claim. Much like the First Circuit in RodríguezReyes, the Third Circuit drew a distinction between evidentiary
standards and pleading standards and held that the plaintiff had
128
sufficiently pleaded her claim. After asking “the parties to comment
on the continued viability of the Supreme Court’s decision in
118. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
119. Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013).
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 58.
122. Id. at 53–54.
123. Id. at 54 n.3.
124. Id. (citation omitted).
125. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
126. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
127. Id. at 206.
128. See id. at 213. The court also stated that
[a]t this stage of the litigation, the District Court should have focused on the
appropriate threshold question—namely whether Fowler pleaded she is an individual
with a disability. The District Court and UPMC instead focused on what Fowler can
“prove,” apparently maintaining that since she cannot prove she is disabled she
cannot sustain a prima facie failure-to-transfer claim. A determination whether a
prima facie case has been made, however, is an evidentiary inquiry—it defines the
quantum of proof plaintiff must present to create a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination.
Id.
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Swierkiewicz,” the court found that “Swierkiewicz is based, in part, on
Conley” and “that because Conley has been specifically repudiated by
both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it
129
concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley.”
The most recent circuit court to radically reinterpret preTwombly authority is the Fourth Circuit in McCleary-Evans v.
Maryland Department of Transportation. The plaintiff in McClearyEvans, an African American female, brought a claim against her
130
employer alleging violations of Title VII. Specifically, the plaintiff
alleged that her employer gave two positions to white candidates,
131
instead of to her, on account of her race and gender. The district
court held that the plaintiff’s “complaint failed to allege facts that
plausibly support a claim of discrimination” and granted the
132
defendant’s motion to dismiss.
On appeal, McCleary-Evans claimed “that the district court
imposed on her a pleading standard ‘more rigorous’ than
133
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. allows.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court and held that the plaintiff’s reliance on Swierkiewicz
134
was misplaced. Judge Niemeyer noted that Swierkiewicz “applied a
pleading standard more relaxed than the plausible-claim standard
135
required by Iqbal and Twombly.” The dissent, written by Judge
Wynn, contended that Swierkiewicz should have applied, saying that
the majority had “entirely ignore[d] the factual underpinnings of the
Swierkiewicz holding, looking solely to the Supreme Court’s 2009
136
decision in Iqbal to guide its decision.” Despite the apparent tension
between Iqbal and Swierkiewicz, Judge Wynn noted that lower
federal courts “have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court
decision no matter . . . how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s
137
current thinking the decision seems.”

129. Id. at 211.
130. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-573).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 584 (citation omitted).
134. See id. at 586 (“A closer look at Swierkiewicz . . . reveals that it does not support
[McCleary-Evans’s] position.”).
135. Id. at 587.
136. Id. at 589 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 590 (alteration in original) (quoting Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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These three circuits have effectively overruled Swierkiewicz
insofar as it relies on Conley for the appropriate Rule 8(a) pleading
requirements. Because Leatherman also relies on Conley, it can be
assumed that these courts would also question Leatherman’s
continued utility. The circuits are clearly split on the viability of preTwombly case law. With this uncertainty at the circuit level, the
confusion is only compounded among the district courts.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Although some commentators contend that Twombly and Iqbal
can be read as consistent with prior notice-pleading case law,
138
questions remain as to the vitality of pre-Twombly precedent. Just
because it is possible to interpret these cases as being consistent with
one another does not mean that this is the approach being taken by
the lower courts. So, the question driving this study is as follows: How
are lower courts treating Swierkiewicz and Leatherman now that they
must apply the plausibility-pleading framework announced by
Twombly and Iqbal?
To answer this question, this study focuses on district court cases
decided between June 2009 and December 2014. This date span
begins one month after Iqbal was decided, allowing time for district
courts to begin applying plausibility pleading trans-substantively. The
study is limited to claims involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. As 12(b)(6) motions test the legal
sufficiency of a claim, these are the cases where courts decide the
appropriate pleading standard, thus giving insight into how lower
courts have treated Leatherman and Swierkiewicz after Twombly and
Iqbal. The district court cases were gathered from the commercial
139
database Westlaw based on a search in the federal district court
database that first excluded cases involving pro se plaintiffs and then
searching for all cases that (1) had a claim involving “42 U.S.C. 1983,”
140
and (2) included a citation to “12(b)(6).” The considerations
138. See Steinman, supra note 12, at 1302 (arguing that attempts to read Rule 8’s general
pleading standards more strictly, pre-Twombly, “were consistently rebuffed by the Supreme
Court in unequivocal terms”).
139. All cases in this study were returned using the search terms “42 U.S.C. 1983” &
“12(b)(6) % pro se” in the Westlaw federal district court database (DCT).
140. This search was conducted on March 23, 2015. Some of the cases retrieved were cases
involving Rule 12(c) motions for judgments on the pleadings. These cases were included in the
results because Rule 12(c) motions are decided under the same legal standard as Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. See, e.g., Bank of New York v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 922 (2d Cir. 2010)
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informing this choice were similar to other studies. This search
retrieved 732 opinions meeting the search terms. Of these, seventyfour cited Leatherman or Swierkiewicz.
Both Leatherman and Swierkiewicz were civil-rights cases.
Focusing on cases that involved § 1983 claims, the main statutory
vehicle for bringing civil-rights claims, ensured that the cases
represent a variety of civil-rights claims. This variety guaranteed that
there would be cases where it was appropriate for plaintiffs to rely on
either Leatherman or Swierkiewicz for support.
This sample size—seventy-four opinions—is adequate because
the goal of this study is not to identify a quantitative trend, but rather
to engage in a substantive analysis of lower-court decisions. This Note
aims to assess the continued vitality of pre-Twombly precedent after
Iqbal and highlight the confusion among lower courts. The hope is
that this study will serve as an impetus for future empirical work from
which broader conclusions can be discerned regarding lower courts’
reinterpretation of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz in ways that the
Supreme Court did not appear to intend.
This study is unique in so far as it looks at the substance of these
seventy-four cases and categorizes them based on their treatment of
pre-Twombly precedent. All seventy-four cases were read and
divided into three categories: positive, negative, and neutral. Cases
falling in the positive category made statements that Leatherman and
Swierkiewicz remained good law. These cases also either squarely
applied a notice-pleading standard or viewed plausibility pleading
through the lens of pre-Twombly case law. Negative cases applied a
plausibility-pleading standard but did so by radically reinterpreting
pre-Twombly precedent. By “radically reinterpret,” I mean that these
cases noted that a plaintiff’s reliance on Leatherman or Swierkiewicz
was misguided and found that these cases no longer controlled in light
of Iqbal, despite the fact that Twombly and Iqbal never overruled any

(“The same standard applicable to . . . 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss applies to . . . 12(c) motions
for judgment on the pleadings.”).
141. See, e.g., CECIL ET AL., supra note 15, at 6 n.10 (choosing to exclude pro se and prisoner
cases because they are “governed by standards other than Twombly and Iqbal”); Hannon, supra
note 15, at 1828–29 (analyzing 12(b)(6) motions to examine if federal district courts require
more from pleadings after Twombly because (1) “the 12(b)(6) motion is used to test the legal
sufficiency of a claim”; (2) Twombly affirmed a grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to make “its most
sweeping pronouncements regarding Rule 8” and introduce plausibility pleading; and (3)
12(b)(6) motions are easy to analyze empirically because they can only “be granted, denied, or
granted-in-part/denied-in-part”).
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pre-Twombly precedents. Cases were labeled neutral if they cited to
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz but did not make any statements as to
the continued vitality of these cases. Neutral cases appeared either to
apply plausibility pleading or to reconcile the tension in the Court’s
pleading jurisprudence. This methodology yielded the following
results.
V. DISTRICT COURT TREATMENT OF PRE-TWOMBLY CASE LAW
AFTER IQBAL
The federal district courts, the front lines of litigation, take
differing views on the proper pleading standard and the continued
viability of pre-Twombly case law. Each of the 732 district court cases
gathered here assesses, at least in part, the sufficiency of a complaint
143
being challenged under Rule 12(b)(6). This Part looks at the
substance of some of these decisions and how they affected a court’s
ruling on the motion to dismiss.
A. District Court Cases: The Substance
The majority of the district court cases read for this study apply a
plausibility-pleading standard, meaning that they directly apply the
standard laid out in Twiqbal. This is true for about 77 percent (57 of
74) of the cases reviewed. Of great interest here, roughly 24.6 percent
(14 of 57) of the cases that applied plausibility pleading do so by
144
radically reinterpreting pre-Twombly precedent.

142. These courts never outright decided that Leatherman or Swierkiewicz were overruled.
Rather, they overrule these cases by implication by noting that they are no longer useful in light
of Twombly and Iqbal.
143. The remaining 658 cases in the data set that do not cite Leatherman or Swierkiewicz are
comprised of civil-rights claims that do not involve employment discrimination or municipal
liability. Section 1983 is the main vehicle for redressing constitutional and federal statutory
violations. Thus, the types of claims falling under § 1983 vary greatly. Some examples of claims
found in the 658 cases in this study were claims brought by prisoners, excessive force claims,
violations of procedural and substantive due process, and unlawful search and seizure claims.
Because these claims did not cite to Leatherman or Swierkiewicz they are not reviewed further
here.
144. In other words, 18.9 percent (14 of 74) of the cases apply Iqbal and effectively overrule
pre-Twombly precedent. The remaining forty-three of the fifty-seven cases that apply a
plausibility-pleading standard do not call into question the vitality of pre-Twombly case law.
These forty-three cases are categorized as neutral and are not specifically reviewed here since
they do not express views on the continued utility of pre-Twombly precedent.
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Hodges v. Government of District of Columbia is paradigmatic
of the reasoning district courts are applying in cases that are
effectively overruling pre-Twombly precedent—that is, reasoning that
questions Swierkiewicz and Leatherman’s vitality. The plaintiffs, four
individuals, were arrested for disorderly conduct and released
146
following a “post-and-forfeit” procedure. The procedure involved
the plaintiffs paying $35.00 “to obtain their immediate release and
147
resolution of their criminal charges.” Plaintiffs were offered the
option of following the post-and-forfeit procedure or spending the
148
night in jail and appearing before a court in the morning. Plaintiffs
brought suit under § 1983 alleging that they were offered no other
release options (such as citation and release) and argued that this
149
policy and their arrests violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
The district court held that the plaintiffs’ complaints failed to state a
150
claim under § 1983.
Specifically, the court noted that even though this claim arose
under § 1983, it had to “satisfy the criteria established in Iqbal and
151
Twombly.” Although it noted that the D.C. Circuit had once
articulated a less stringent pleading standard, the court stated that
this precedent “preceded Iqbal, and must now be interpreted in light
152
of that subsequent Supreme Court decision.” The court rejected the
reasoning that “Twombly and Iqbal should be read in conjunction
with earlier cases on the sufficiency of municipal-liability allegations,
in particular, Leatherman” by stating that “[t]his Court is not
153
confident that the Leatherman test survives Twombly and Iqbal.”
Rather than deal with the fact that the court had two applicable lines
of reasoning before it, the court simply brushed away relevant
154
Supreme Court authority.
145. Hodges v. Gov’t of D.C., 975 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2013).
146. Id. at 38.
147. Id. at 39.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 48. Plaintiffs also alleged that they were arrested without probable cause and that
the arrest violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 39.
150. Id. at 47–48.
151. Id. at 54.
152. Id. (quoting Smith v. District of Columbia, 674 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 n.2 (D.D.C. 2009)).
153. Id. at 55 n.15.
154. Other district courts have applied the same reasoning with different language. See, e.g.,
Hass v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:13-CV-01746 JAM KJN, 2014 WL 1616440, at *6
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s citation to pre-Twombly case law is unhelpful . . . given
the heightened pleading requirements that have subsequently developed.”).
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One final example of the reasoning district courts apply when
effectively overruling pre-Twombly case law is Mayfield v. County of
155
Merced. The plaintiff, a lawyer, filed suit under Title VII and § 1983
against her employer, alleging race and sex discrimination and
156
retaliation. The District Court for the Eastern District of California
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim and
found the plaintiff’s “reliance on Leatherman . . . for the premise that
a complaint must only include a ‘short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ is outdated. The
current pleading standard was altered by the Supreme Court’s
157
decision in Twombly.” This quote highlights absolute confusion
over the state of pleading standards. Although this is a reasonable
interpretation of what the Court did in Twombly, other courts
maintain that, even after Twombly, a plaintiff still need only assert “a
158
short and plain statement” of the claim to satisfy Rule 8(a). No
matter the language these courts use, the former reasoning still
159
effectively renders Leatherman and Swierkiewicz “hollow shell[s].”
On the other end of the spectrum, about 23 percent (17 of 74) of
the cases in this study cite Swierkiewicz and Leatherman positively
and apply them without regard to Twiqbal. Two recent cases illustrate
the types of cases that fall into the category of “positive” in their
treatment of pre-Twombly precedent. In Hernandez v. County of
160
Monterey, the plaintiffs were inmates or recently released inmates
161
of the Monterey County jail. Their complaints alleged, in part,
overcrowding, inadequate training, poor facilities, and inadequate
162
access to medical and mental health care screening. The court
dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss and, after citing
Twombly, quoted directly from Swierkiewicz and stated that the court
could only dismiss a claim when “it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with
155. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant County of Merced’s Motion to
Dismiss, Mayfield v. Cty. of Merced, No. 1:13-cv-01619, 2014 WL 5822913 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2014).
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id. at *2 n.3.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Moreover, from a common-sense perspective, a statement of the
claim can state plausible facts and still be “short and plain” in nature.
159. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 592 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wynn, J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-573).
160. Hernandez v. Cty. of Monterey, 70 F. Supp. 3d 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
161. Id. at 967.
162. Id. at 968.

TESORIERO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1544

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/15/2016 12:30 PM

[Vol. 65:1521

163

the allegations.” Applying this language, which was based on
164
Conley, is akin to applying a notice-pleading standard.
165
Finally, in Jackson v. Pena the victim of a police-involved
shooting sued individual police officers, the Baltimore Police
166
Department, the mayor, and the city council under § 1983. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, but
found that the plaintiff did allege facts sufficient to state a municipal167
liability claim against the police department. The court squarely
168
applied Leatherman. Noting that there is no heightened pleading for
municipal claims, the court stated that in order to survive a motion to
dismiss a plaintiff pleading a municipal-liability claim “need only
satisfy Rule 8(a) by providing ‘a short and plain statement of the
169
claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.’” Although some courts
have seen Twombly and Iqbal as causing a sea change in pleading
jurisprudence, the courts mentioned here show that notice pleading is
still being applied in the post-Iqbal era.
The seventy-four cases analyzed in this study yield two important
observations. First, courts remain confused about what pleading
standard to apply, especially given the tension between pre-Twombly
case law and the plausibility-pleading standard announced in
Twiqbal. Second, some courts resolve this tension by effectively
overruling Swierkiewicz and Leatherman despite Supreme Court
pronouncements that these cases remain good law. These
observations highlight a need for further study and, perhaps, Supreme
Court intervention.
B. District Court Cases: The Results
Thus far this study has been unique in its attempts to assess
Twombly and Iqbal’s impact by focusing on application and reasoning
rather than results alone. Although the focus should be on accurate
lower-court reasoning and analysis independent of results, actual
outcomes for the parties are important. Looking at the outcomes of
163. Id. at 969 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
164. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).
165. Jackson v. Pena, 28 F. Supp. 3d 423 (D. Md. 2014).
166. Id. at 427.
167. Id. at 434–35.
168. Id. at 433.
169. Id. (quoting Lanford v. Prince George’s Cty., 199 F. Supp. 2d 297, 304 (D. Md. 2002)).
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these motions to dismiss also helps identify substantive trends. This
Section shows how courts have ruled on 12(b)(6) motions depending
upon their treatment of pre-Twombly case law. The results are
recorded in Table 1.
Table 1. Overall Results of 12(b)(6) Motions
Treatment of
Pre-Twombly Caselaw

Swierkiewicz

Leatherman

Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral

Motion
Granted

Motion
Denied

0
2
11
0
4
7

3
0
4
1
0
2

Granted in
Part & Denied
in Part
7
4
14
6
4
5

These results show a potential correlation between how courts
treat pre-Twombly authority and how they rule on defendants’
motions to dismiss: when courts have taken a positive view of
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, they have not granted a motion to
dismiss in full. That is not to say that these courts let any and all
claims through. These same courts have, on thirteen occasions, still
engaged in merits screening at the pleading stage by granting the
170
motion in part and denying it in part. Conversely, none of the
observed courts that effectively overruled Leatherman and
Swierkiewicz denied a motion to dismiss. This means that, in these
courts, plaintiffs and their lawyers are relying on good law to their
detriment.
In contrast, the wider spread of results in the “neutral” category
may reflect attempts to reconcile the tension in pleading standard
jurisprudence. Rather than deciding that either pre-Twombly case
law or Twiqbal plausibility applies to all cases, these courts appear to
170. These thirteen cases are comprised of the “positive” treatments of both Swierkiewicz
and Leatherman recorded in the “Granted in Part & Denied in Part” column of Table 1.
Looking at these “mixed” results is also revealing. Courts that treated Swierkiewicz and
Leatherman positively or neutrally were more likely to deny the 12(b)(6) motion for the part of
the claim based on § 1983. Conversely, the courts that reinterpreted pre-Twombly case law and
severely questioned their viability were more likely to grant the 12(b)(6) motion when it came
to § 1983 claims.
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be looking at each case’s underlying facts to decide which of the two
relevant standards applies. For example, in Kleehammer v. Monroe
171
County the court noted that the plaintiff contended that “the
pleading standard for an employment-discrimination case was set by
172
the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz.” In assessing this claim, the
court laid out the pleading standard it was applying as follows:
The Twombly court held that Swierkiewicz remains good law.
However, some courts and commentators have concluded that
Twombly and Iqbal repudiated Swierkiewicz, at least to the extent
that Swierkiewicz relied upon pre-Twombly pleading standards.
Reconciling Swierkiewicz, Twombly, and Iqbal, a complaint need
not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination to
survive a motion to dismiss; however, “the claim must be facially
plausible and must give fair notice to the defendants of the basis for
173
the claim.”

Until the Supreme Court speaks again on the issue, this approach
aligns most closely with Supreme Court pronouncements on how
174
Namely, by
lower courts should treat conflicting precedent.
recognizing that absent a Supreme Court ruling, the relevant case law
still applies.
These observations are based off of the seventy-four cases read
for this study. A larger trans-substantive study is necessary to confirm
these trends and provide greater insight regarding how Twombly and
Iqbal and lower-court treatment of pre-Twombly authority are
affecting access to the next phases of litigation. But this study does
begin to reveal the confusion lower courts are facing as they attempt
to assess the continued vitality of pre-Twombly precedent.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFUSION
The cases in this study illustrate the “confusion and disarray
among judges and lawyers” caused by the tension between pre-

171. Kleehammer v. Monroe Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 175 (W.D.N.Y 2010).
172. Id. at 183.
173. Barbosa v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Fowler v. Scores Holding Co., 677 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679 (S.D.N.Y.
2009)).
174. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).
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175

These cases produce two
Twombly precedent and Twiqbal.
additional insights. First, that some courts are effectively overruling
relevant Supreme Court case law. And second, that notice pleading is
far from retired.
A. Lower Courts Reinterpreting Pre-Twombly Precedent
Twombly’s announcement that Rule 8(a)(2) required a plaintiff
to plead plausible facts in their complaint was “wholly inconsistent
176
with Supreme Court precedent.” However, other than abrogating
Conley, the Court did not overrule any of its other Rule 8(a)
jurisprudence. As this study has shown, to reconcile this
inconsistency, some courts have effectively overruled Leatherman and
Swierkiewicz. This approach is unacceptable for two reasons.
First, lower courts overruling Leatherman and Swierkiewicz run
afoul of the Supreme Court’s longstanding instruction that only the
177
Court has “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
Although these lower courts are clearly wrong, they are not entirely
to blame. The Supreme Court has sent them conflicting messages and
has itself deviated from the requirements of stare decisis. As Justice
178
White noted in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, “the
doctrine of stare decisis demands that we attempt to reconcile our
179
prior decisions rather than hastily overrule some of them.” But this
does not seem to have been the Court’s approach in Twombly and
Iqbal. Rather than announce that the Court was creating a new
pleading standard, thereby being forced to both confront past
180
precedent and provide a “special justification” for doing so, the
Court maintained that it simply was not raising pleading standards.
Thus, commands that only the Court can overrule its precedents
coupled with the Court’s unwillingness to reconcile its past
175. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 31 (2010).
176. Spencer, supra note 78, at 460.
177. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at
484); see also Ides, supra note 69, at 635 (“Of course, the Court is free to overrule any line of
cases, but in the absence of an express overruling one should at least be circumspect in
concluding that the execution has occurred.”); Steinman, supra note 12, at 1323 (arguing against
the view that because Twombly and Iqbal are in “profound conflict with prior precedent that
lower courts ought to deem the earlier cases to have been implicitly overruled”).
178. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
179. Id. at 99–100.
180. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“[D]eparture from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification.”).
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precedents with newly created standards puts lower courts in a bind.
Lower courts see the Supreme Court saying that is not creating a
heightened pleading standard but, given that plausibility pleading
seems inconsistent with earlier Rule 8(a) case law, these courts
believe the Supreme Court is actually heightening pleading standards.
Moreover, since the Court is giving them ambiguous instructions on
how to apply plausibility pleading, it is, in essence, licensing the type
of behavior observed in lower courts in this study.
Second, and more simply, lower courts that are effectively
overruling binding Supreme Court case law are denying plaintiffs
justice because plaintiffs and their lawyers are relying to their
detriment on cases they believe to be good law.
B. Confusion in the Lower Courts
The confusion among lower courts after Iqbal is further
highlighted by the fact that some courts are still applying an outright
notice-pleading standard. There are “federal interests in uniformity,
certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation” and the
discordant approaches taken by lower courts undermine these
181
interests.
The lack of a uniform and clear pleading standard introduces
uncertainty at the earliest stage of the federal litigation process.
Uncertainty raises costs in any system, and the federal court system is
no different. Post-Twombly, federal courts must now deal with an
increased workload, as there has been an increase in the filings of
182
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Moreover, parties are
now forced to spend more time preparing a complaint, to state more
facts without the benefit of pretrial discovery, and to perhaps even
increase the length of their pleadings to preemptively fend off
challenges under Iqbal. These reactions increase cost and also waste
the most precious of judicial resources, time. Ironically, these costs
are antithetical to the policy goals of making litigation less

181. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 313(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5114–15, as recognized
in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).
182. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 15, at 21–22 (finding a general increase from 2006 to 2010
in the rate of filings of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
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burdensome and freeing courts of meritless claims that were the main
183
drivers of the Courts decision in Iqbal.
From a historical perspective, the uncertainty currently
surrounding pleading standards returns us to a time when a plaintiff’s
claims could be dismissed because the law was confusing and rife with
184
technicalities. Plaintiffs may believe that they are relying on good
law only to have their claims dismissed by a court that takes it upon
itself to radically reinterpret valid Supreme Court precedent on
pleading standards. Moreover, just as it was difficult to distinguish
between “material facts,” evidentiary facts, and conclusions under
185
Code pleading, it is also difficult to reliably identify what claims a
court will find conclusory or plausible. Courts are supposed to
vindicate rights, but if the esoteric debate over what facts are
possible, plausible, or probable locks a plaintiff out of court, then
citizens seeking their day in court will lose their faith in the judicial
system.
Quite simply, there is a guidance function to the rule of law and
to fulfill it the Supreme Court should clarify pleading standards. The
conflicting approaches taken by lower federal courts illustrate that
judges are unsure over the proper pleading standard to apply. Five
years have passed since Iqbal, and pleading standards have not
worked themselves out. On the contrary, every day that passes seems
to invite further judicial creation of ways to reconcile the tension in
the Court’s pleading jurisprudence. This includes some courts
accepting that invitation by effectively overruling two major Rule 8
precedents. The issue is ripe for review. The recent McCleary-Evans
case presents a clean issue for the court to decide once and for all if
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz have been retired too.
CONCLUSION
Claims that “Conley has been overruled” or that “notice
pleading is dead” spark exciting debates. But they are simply not true.
Swierkiewicz and Leatherman went untouched by Twiqbal and have

183. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009) (“Litigation, though necessary to
ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and
expenditure of valuable time and resources . . . .”).
184. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text (discussing the technicalities of commonlaw pleading).
185. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text (discussing the practical issues presented
by Code pleading).
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not officially earned their retirement. Yet, as this study has shown,
some lower courts have deemed these pre-Twombly precedents to no
longer be viable. Radically reinterpreting good law leaves litigants
and their attorneys with the burdens accompanying uncertainty.
As Judge Clark noted, paper pleadings cannot take the place of a
186
trial on the merits. The goal of the draftsmen of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure was to create procedures that “most efficiently
187
foster decisions on the merits.” The disagreement among lower
courts about the continued vitality of pre-Twombly precedent
presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to revive this goal.

186. Clark, supra note 1, at 46.
187. Carter, supra note 35, at 2179.

